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Introduction 
As WE FACE the challenge of countering ever-more-prevalent dis- 
criminatory and divisive attitudes and actions in our society, the 
Word "hate" has been increasingly prominent in our political dis- 
course. As experience teaches, anyone can be both accused of and 
~ubjected to "hatred" based on a wide range of personal character- 
istics and beliefs. The terms "hate speech" and "hate crimes" are 
u.sed to demonize and to call for punishing a broad array of expres- 
sion, including political discourse that is integral to our democracy. 
. The term "hate speech" is not a legal term of art, with a spe- 
ci~c definition; rather, it is deployed to stigmatize and to suppress 
Widely varying expression. The most generally understood meaning 
0: "hate speech" is expression that conveys hateful or discriminatory 
Views against specific individuals or groups, particularly those who 
have historically faced discrimination. 
t Beyond this core meaning, many people have hurled the epi- 
h~t "hate speech" against a diverse range of messages that they 
reiect, including messages about many important public policy 
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issues. Moreover, too much rhetoric equates "hate speech" with 
violent criminal conduct. On many campuses, for example, stu- 
dents complain that they have been "assaulted" when they are 
exposed to ideas that offend them, or even if they learn that 
a provocative speaker has been invited to campus. This false 
equation between controversial ideas and physical violence fuels 
unwarranted calls for outlawing and punishing ideas, along with 
violence. 
To be sure, campuses and other arenas in our society must strive 
to be inclusive, to make everyone welcome, especially those who 
traditionally have been excluded or marginalized. But that inclusiv- 
iry must also extend to those who voice unpopular ideas, especially 
on campus, where ideas should be most freely aired, discussed, and 
debated. Encountering "unwelcome" ideas, including those that are 
hateful and discriminatory, :ts essential for hottinl'our abilities to 
analyze, criticize, and refute them. On that point, I would like to 
invoke the inaugural convocation address by Ruth Simmons, Brown 
University's president from 2001 to 2012, the first African-American 
president of any Ivy League university, and Brown's first female 
president: 
You know something that I hate? When people say, "That doesn't 
make me feel good about myself." I say, "That's not what you're 
here for." ... I believe that learning at its best is the antithesis 
of comfort. [l]f you come to this [campus] for comfort, I would 
urge you to walk [through] yon iron gate .... But if you seek 
betterment for yourself, for your community and posterity, stay 
and fight. 
Discussions about "hate speech" have been clouded by conclu- 
sory condemnations, conflating many kinds of expression and action. 
Instead, we must draw critical distinctions between ideas that are 
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INTRODUCTION 
disfavored, disturbing, or feared, which should be protected, and 
actions that are discriminatory or violent, which should be punished. 
My mission in this work is to refute the argument that the United 
States, following the lead of many other nations, should adopt a 
broad concept of illegal "hate speech," and to demonstrate why such 
a course would not only violate fundamental precepts of our democ- 
racy but also do more harm than good. 
THE ESSENTIAL DISTINCTION BETWEEN PROTECTED 
AND PUNISHABLE "HATE SPEECH" 
Debates about these issues are often marred by widespread con- 
fusion about the governing free speech principles. Too many peo- 
ple, including even some lawyers, wrongly assert that under our 
Constitution "hate speech" is either absolutely protected or com- 
pletely unprotected. Neither statement is accurate. 
On the one hand, many who argue that we should revise our 
law to empower government to punish "hate speech" wrongly 
assume that such speech is now absolutely protected. In support 
~f their proposals, they cite many examples of speech that already 
ts subject to sanction in the United States, consistent with long- 
standing free speech principles. For example, they regularly point 
to speech that constitutes a genuine threat or targeted harass- 
lllent, and thus directly causes specific imminent serious harm, 
lllaking it already punishable consistent with the emergency 
Principle. 
On the other hand, too many people wrongly assert that "hate 
speech is not free speech," assuming that speech with a hateful mes- 
sage is automatically excluded from First Amendment protection. 
Consistent with the cardinal viewpoint neutrality principle, however, 
government may not punish "hate speech" (or speech conveying any 
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particular point of view) merely because some of us-even the vast 
majority of us-consider its views or ideas objectionable or even 
abhorrent. For that reason, no matter what adjective we might use 
to excoriate speech whose ideas we disfavor-including "hateful," 
"abusive," "unwelcome," "offensive," "dangerous," or "violent" (to 
cite some epithets that are invoked by advocates of suppressing the 
designated speech)-such disfavor alone does not warrant censoring 
the speech. 
Moreover, speech may not be censored because its message might 
have a disturbing impact on the hearts or minds of some audience 
members. Viewpoint-based restrictions pose the greatest danger to 
the core value underlying the First Amendment: our right as individ- 
uals to make our own choices about what ideas we choose to express, 
receive, and believe. Because they distort public debate, viewpoint- 
based regulations are also antithetical to our democratic politi- 
cal system. Additionally, they violate equality principles because, 
reflecting majoritarian political pressures, they generally target 
unpopular, minority, and dissenting views and speakers. Censorship 
of "hate speech" is also unjustified by the speech's feared harmful 
tendency: the generalized fear that it might indirectly contribute to 
future negative conduct by some people who hear or read it. 
These speech-protective precepts are not based on a presump- 
tion that speech cannot cause harm. To the contrary, we cherish 
speech precisely because of its unique capacity to influence us, both 
positively and negatively. But even though speech can contribute 
to potential harms, it would be more harmful to both individuals 
and society to empower the government to suppress speech for that 
reason, except consistent with the emergency and viewpoint neu- 
trality principles. This book substantiates that conclusion with man)' 
examples from many different countries. 
The Supreme Court strongly reaffirmed the foregoing First 
Amendment principles in a 2011 case in which it upheld the 
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right of individuals to engage in extremely, hurtful and offen- 
sive speech: picketing outside the funerals of military veterans 
with signs conveying hateful views about military personnel, 
Catholics, the pope, and gay men and lesbians. As the Court 
explained: 
Speech is powerful. It can stir people to action, move them to 
tears of both joy and sorrow, and-as it did here-inflict great 
pain. [W]e cannot react to that pain by punishing the speaker. 
As a Nation we have chosen a different course-to protect even 
hurtful speech on public issues to ensure that we do not stifle 
public debate. 
The Court's near-unanimity in this case is noteworthy, and typi- 
cal of its free speech rulings. In recent decades, the Court has been 
closely divided ideologically, often splitting 5-4 on other constitu- 
tional controversies. But justices across the ideological spectrum 
have consistently been united by strong support for the core free- 
dom of speech principles, even when the speech conveys hateful 
and hated views. 
This robust understanding of our First Amendment should 
likewise transcend partisan divides in our political sphere, because 
the underlying principles protect all speakers-and all audience 
members-whatever our views, and whoever we are. That critical 
point was stressed in the midst of the civil rights movement by a 
1961 New York court ruling that upheld the free speech rights of an 
American Nazi to convey racist ideas, consistent with the viewpoint 
neutrality and emergency principles. The judge explained that these 
principles also redounded to the benefit of the civil rights activists 
who were conveying precisely the opposite, antiracist ideas, and 
who consistently were threatened with censorship in communities 
[ s l 
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where their ideas were despised and feared, including the many cam- 
puses that excluded them: 
[T]he unpopularity of views, ... their obnoxiousness is not 
enough [to justify suppressing them]. Otherwise, the anti- 
racist ... could be suppressed, if he undertakes to speak in 
"restricted" areas; and one who asks that public schools be 
open indiscriminately to all ethnic groups could be lawfully 
suppressed, if only he choose to speak where persuasion is 
needed most. 
The fact that "hate speech" laws inevitably endanger views 
across the political spectrum is confirmed by recent experience 
under such laws in European countries. In a September 2017 
essay, entitled "In Europe, Hate Speech Laws Are Often Used 
to Suppress and Punish Left-Wing Viewpoints," journalist Glenn 
Greenwald writes: 
Many Americans who long for Europe's hate speech restrictions 
assume that those laws are used to outlaw and punish expres- 
sion of the bigoted ideas they most hate: racism, homophobia, 
Islamophobia, misogyny. Often, such laws are used that way .... 
But hate speech restrictions ... in those countries ... have fre- 
quently been used to constrain and sanction a wide range of 
political views that many left-wing censorship advocates would 
never dream could be deemed "hateful," and even against opin- 
ions which many of them likely share. 
If we allowed government to suppress speech that might exert 
a negative influence on our minds or actions, then no speech would 
be safe. As Supreme Court Justice Oliver Wendell Holmes declared 
in a landmark 1919 dissent, in which he strongly repudiated the 
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majority's bad tendency doctrine, "Every idea· is an incitement." 
He did not mean by this statement that government may therefore 
suppress every idea, but rather the opposite: that government may 
suppress speech only when it directly causes specific, imminent, 
and serious harm. 
As history teaches, permitting the government to punish speech 
based on any lesser connection between the speech and the feared 
harm would be a license for witch hunts-literally, as well as figura- 
tively. Justice Louis Brandeis reminded us of this danger in his 1927 
opinion in Whitney v. California, which Justice Holmes joined. After 
rejecting the majority's bad tendency standard, and its conclusion 
that the government could constitutionally punish Socialist Party 
activist Anita Whitney because her socialist advocacy might lead 
to "terrorism and violence," Brandeis wrote: "Fear of serious injury 
cannot alone justify suppression of free speech .... Men feared 
witches and burnt women." Accordingly, he articulated the highly 
speech-protective emergency standard that the Court finally unani- 
mously endorsed in 1969: "Only an emergency can justify repres- 
sion." Brandeis added that if the message's potential danger does 
nor rise to the level of an emergency, the proper response is "more 
speech, not enforced silence." 
The "hate speech" laws that many other countries now enforce, 
which license government to punish speech solely because its mes- 
sa . di f ge is ts avored, disturbing, or feared, too often are enforced to 
suppress today's counterparts of Anita Whitney: those who express 
unpopular, dissenting views. It would hardly constitute progress for 
the United States to revert to a legal regime that enables officials to 
silence their critics, 
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MORE SPEECH, NOT LESS 
Violent and discriminatory conduct must be swiftly punished, and 
speech conveying discriminatory, hateful ideas should be strongly 
rebutted. But punishing ideas we consider hateful or discriminatory 
not only violates the fundamental free speech principles outlined 
above; it also may well increase intergroup distrust and discrimina- 
tion rather than reducing them. Evidence suggests that none of us is 
immune from "implicit" or unconscious biases that pervade our soci- , 
ety, with its entrenched structural discrimination. Therefore, speech 
that reflects discriminatory stereotypes can often result from igno- 
rance or insensitivity rather than malevolence. Of course, we must 
vigorously combat bias, including of the unintended variety. But the 
tools for doing so should be calibrated appropriately. Someone who 
negligently conveys stereotyped views is likely to respond more pos- 
itively to constructive educational outreach than to accusations of 
and punishment for "hate speech." Indeed, as I discuss in Chapter 8, 
even for people who consciously harbor and express hateful views, 
educational strategies are more promising than censorship for alter- 
ing such views and curbing their influence. 
Just as "hate speech" and bias crimes are, alas, abounding, so too 
are resources for countering them, with a wealth of information, train- 
ing, and organizations that empower all of us to speak up both for our- 
selves, if we are disparaged, and for others whom such speech targets. 
Also abounding are non-censorial measures for curbing the potential 
harm to which constitutionally protected "hate speech" is feared 
to contribute: discrimination, violence, and psychic injuries. The 
recently emergent interdisciplinary field of "hate studies" explores 
these kinds of non-censorial interventions, and human rights activists 
around the world have advocated increased reliance on them. 
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Especially positive is the increasing counterspeech we have been 
hearing from members of groups who have been disparaged by "hate 
speech," as well as from many other community members and lead- 
ers Th' · · · · is nsmg resistance to hateful words and deeds through the 
force of free speech-while also resisting the force of either cen- 
sorship or violence-has been encouragingly evident in the face of 
demonstrations by "alt-right" and similar groups. We have witnessed 
a remarkable and bipartisan outpouring of speech and peaceful dem- 
onstrations that have denounced hateful ideologies and violence, 
and that have celebrated our nation's renewed commitments to 
equality, inclusivity, and intergroup harmony. This counterspeech 
chorus reaffirms the First Amendment's essential role in promoting 
these fundamental goals. 
